THE security landscape in Balochistan has grown increasingly complex, with a surge in terrorist attacks carried out by Baloch insurgents and the silent but calculated entry of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) into the conflict.

In an unexpected move, IS-K has declared war not only on the Pakistani state but also on the insurgents themselves, denouncing their nationalist agendas as unIslamic.

Recently, IS-K released a booklet denouncing ethno-linguistic nationalist movements in Pakistan, explicitly targeting the Baloch and Pakhtun nationalist movements. The group singled out the BYC and its leader Mahrang Baloch, as well as the PTM and its leader, Manzoor Pashteen. The release of this threatening booklet was alarming in itself. However, the following day, IS-K escalated matters by issuing an audio statement formally declaring war on Baloch insurgents, justifying the move by accusing the Baloch Liberation Army (BL A) of killing its fighters in the Mastung district of Balochistan.

Although IS-K has had a presence in Balochistan since the early days of its parent group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and was one of the first global affiliates to pledge allegiance to its leadership, it had never directly confronted nationalist forces, until now. What does IS-K`s entry into this already volatile theatre mean? And can it reshape the dynamics of conflict in Balochistan? IS-K has been involved in 33 terrorist attacks in Balochistan since 2016, resulting in the deaths of 436 people and injuries to 691 others. Shrines and churches have remained among its primary targets. IS-K has attacked shrines and churches eight times, while among human targets, political figures, especially politicians affiliated with the JUI, are at the top of its hit list. Security forces and polio health workers follow close behind.

Many senior JUI leaders have been targeted by IS-K in Balochistan, including Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri, Hafiz Hamdullah and Maulana Abdul Wasay. While it also targeted a PTI candidate in Sibi, one of the most dangerous attacks was an assassination attempt on former president Arif Alvi, who survived. The group has not spared nationalist leaders and pro-state politicians either. Notably, Siraj Raisani of the BalochistanAwami Party was killed during the 2018 election campaign. Another significant incident was the kidnapping of Chinese nationals, who were held in Mastung.

Interestingly, IS-K operations in Balochistan, like in KP, are limited to specific territories. In KP, its activities are mostly confined to the Bajaur tribal district and Peshawar, where it has carried out 36 and 19 attacks, respectively. IS-K strictly follows the Salafi interpretation of Islam, which is also prevalent in Bajaur and neighbouring regions in Afghanistan, such as Kunar and Nuristan.

These Afghan regions, where IS-K maintains a strong presence, share borders with Pakistan.

However, the operational context in Balochistan is different. IS-K`s activities are concentrated in the central western part of the province, from the outskirts of Quetta to Mastung, Kalat, and parts of Khuzdar. From Mastung, its presence extends into Bolan and reaches Sibi district, which borders Sindh. At one point, Sindh`s Counter-Terrorism Department reported that IS-K had established training camps in Balochistan near the provincial border and was exporting terrorism into Sindh, particularly by radicalising Sindhi youth, especially those from Brahui tribes. These reports surfaced after the February 2017 investigation of the IS-K terrorist attack on the famous shrine of Sehwan Sharif.

Mastung and the outskirts of Quetta serve as IS-K`s major hubs, where it has carried out 12 and 10 attacks, respectively. It also maintains a presence in Kalat, Bolan and Khuzdar, which are nearby. These areas are predominantly inhabited by Baloch communities, many of whom are affiliated with religious organisations. The JUI enjoys strong political support here, and some experts trace this religious inclination to the Qalat state`s pre-merger policy of patronising Deobandi madressahs. Regardless of the reasons, Balochistan has witnessed increasing competition among different Islamic movements, including the TLP and Shia organisations.

Shia madressahs have expanded their presence in the region over the past 15 years. Attacks on Shia pilgrims, particularly by groups like Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, which later merged into IS-K, have occurred along the routes passing through Mastung and Nushki districts. Convoys herehave often been targeted in the past.

The TLP has also established a foothold in this region, primarily through Karachi, extending its influence along the Quetta-Karachi highway.

Certain Baloch residents from this area who live in Karachi have played a key role in spreading this influence. Nonetheless, JUI remains a dominant political force in the region and continues to hold significant electoral power.

One understands why the IS-K targets JUI both in KP and Balochistan the group considers it to be a close ally of the Taliban in Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the armed confrontation between IS-K and the Afghan Taliban has been going on even before the latter`s takeover of that country; the significant difference between the two lies in their views on state structure and the concept of a caliphate. The IS-K believes that the Taliban is a nationalist movement and an ally of the West, and there is no difference between the power elites of Pakistan, other Muslim states, and the Taliban. To IS-K, nationalism is an unIslamic concept, and now it has expanded its circle to nationalist movements in the country, both violent and peaceful.

This development will heighten the threat level for nationalist and rights movements in Balochistan and KP, while also triggering potential clashes between Islamist militants and nationalist insurgents. Until now, both sides had avoided confrontation, despite operating in overlapping territories; however, that dynamic is likely to change. Although the BLA has expanded its operational footprint across much of the province, IS-K remains confined mainly to Mastung and its surrounding areas. Still, its presence could become a significant distraction for the BLA.

It remains uncertain whether this confrontation is necessarily good news for the state`s security institutions. While some may view it as a conflict that could weaken two adversaries simultaneously, the reality may be more complicated.

IS-K is unlikely to abandon its operational strategy; instead, it may adapt and evolve, further complicating the already volatile security environment in Balochistan. • The wúter is a secuáty analyst.