FACING a two-front situation on the borders has long been Pakistan`s nightmare scenario. That is why its security and foreign policy has, over the decades, been predicated on avoiding having to deal simultaneously with external threats on two borders. This policy was shaped by the exigencies of the country`s formative years when it was confronted with a hostile India and contested borders on both its western and eastern flanks bequeathed by colonialism. An early conflict with India and continuing tensions over Kashmir was accompanied by irredentist claims of successive Afghan governments, who questioned the border with Pakistan, demarcated as the Durand Line by the British.

The tyranny of geography imposed heavy burdens on Pakistan. But the lesson learnt from the country`s early years was the strategic imperative of keeping one front defused as active military engagement on both borders was regarded as unsustainable. This was not something Pakistan could always control, but its security strategy aimed at averting a double squeeze from two hot borders. This is exemplified by Pakistan`s efforts to prevent any flare-up of tensions with India in the 1980s during its long involvement in the US-led military campaign against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan.

It is also illustrated by the post-9/11 decade when Pakistan became a front-line state in the US `war on terror` and cooperated in the US/ Nato effort to defeat the Taliban and terrorist groups based in Afghanistan. India`s military mobilisation along the border after a terror attack on the Indian parliament in 2002 compelled Pakistan to deal with two hot fronts for some time. But US mediation helped to end the Pakistan-India military stand-off. What followed was perhaps the longest period of uninterrupted diplomatic engagement between the two countries in a `composite dialogue`. In fact, one of president Pervez Musharraf`s `asks` of the Americans then was for Washington to `watch` Pakistan`s `back` while Pakistani forces were engaged on the Afghan border. The US administration obliged.

Today however, Pakistan faces a three-front security challenge. On the eastern front an implacable foe continues to issue threats and insist its `Operation Sindoor` the name of its military action against Pakistan in May is not over. Onthe western frontier, Pakistan and Afghanistan remain engaged in hostilities. Pakistan also alleges active collusion between Kabul and New Delhi in terrorist attacks on the country. The third front is at home, reflected in the surge in militant attacks that is undermining domestic peace and stability.

This is unprecedented as never before has the country had to deal simultaneously with three fronts. The only bright spot is improved ties between Pakistan and Iran that has helped to address border management problems. This is an encouraging development considering the two neighbours engaged in tit-for-tat missile strikes in January 2024 over activities of militant Baloch groups on both sides of the border.

Relations with Afghanistan have hit a record low because of the Taliban`s unwillingness to act against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), that continues cross-border terror attacks from its Afghan sanctuaries and poses a grave threat to Pakistan`s security. With several rounds of talks yielding little, an increasingly frustrated Islamabad was forced to adopt a coercive policy towards Kabul, especially as Pakistani casualties mounted in terror attacks.

In October, deadly clashes erupted on the border. Pakistan launched air strikes against militant targets in Afghanistan including Kabul while Afghan forces attacked multiple border posts in response. Pakistan retaliated with fierce cross-border strikes. A ceasefire was reached through mediation by Qatar and Turkiye. But subsequent talks ended in deadlock as the Taliban declined to give a written commitment tostop TTP attacks.

The border remains closed and trade suspended.

Islamabad seems to have concluded that with diplomatic efforts exhausted the only option is kinetic as sustained military pressure might have a deterrent effect on the Taliban`s permissive attitude and support for TTP. This is designed to inflict pain on Kabul. But it also entails costs for Pakistan not only in terms of lost trade (annual Pakistani exports are just over $1 billion), but also in overstretching its resources. Pakistani officials acknowledge this but argue they are left with little choice. Nevertheless, prolonged tensions will mean Pakistan`s attention and military resources will have to increasingly be directed or diverted to its western border from the east, despite the latter front being unstable.In the face of continuing Indian belligerence and intimidatory military exercises near its border Pakistan cannot afford to lower its guard. With the Indian leadership apparently wanting to avenge its setback in the May conflict with Pakistan, Islamabad cannot leave anything to chance. True, India took no knee-jerk action after the recent Delhi bomb blast. But recently when its defence minister provocatively suggested that borders can change and Sindh could one day `return to India` Islamabad condemned this as `a threat to regional stability`.

Given New Delhi`s hostility and absent any communication between the two countries, a high degree of unpredictability and risk of miscalculation characterises the situation. Pakistan thus has to keep a watchful eye on the western front and remain in a state of military preparedness. The existential threat after all can come from India, not Afghanistan.

While Pakistan may be unable to do much in the near term to defuse either of the two external fronts (ideally the Afghan front should be over time) the home front is what it can and should control. Two provinces are afflicted by insurgency while terrorists are also striking across the country. Despite notable counterterrorism gains, the internal security situation remains troubling with rising fatalities from terrorism likely to make 2025 the deadliest year in a decade.

Pakistan needs a more effective counterterrorism strategy. Strengthened border controls must involve zero tolerance for corruption and criminality that allow militant movement. The government should also evolve a differentiated approach to deal with militant violence in Balochistan and KP.

In Balochistan, the underlying sources of longstanding public disaffection need to be addressed.

Law enforcement should be accompanied by political and economic measures to win hearts and minds. Effective counter-insurgency operations in KP require rising above partisan politics for better coordination with the opposition-controlled province to secure community support.

Defeating militant violence `within` is a strategic compulsion as a continuing three-front situation is obviously untenable. • The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK andUN.