THE legal system in Pakistan does not serve its people. The systemic problems of our courts are widely acknowledged. Civil disputes remain pending for decades. By the time many civil disputes conclude they cease to matter much to the people who initiate them.

Legal proceedings do not follow rules.

The process is arbitrary and almost always bewildering for the parties involved.

Because rules for admissibility of cases are not enforced, frivolous litigation is admitted rather than dismissed at an early stage.

Such litigation is either filed by the party to harass another or gain some bargaining advantage. Sometimes it is filed because a lawyer, in search for a brief, has wrongly advised a client that their case has merit.

Criminal courts regularly violate the fundamental rights of defendants. Our criminal courts are not independent from the executive as they worl( with law-enforcement agencies to deny the right to fair trial.

Police torture and fabrication of evidence are common practices that are acknowledged and accepted by judges. Defendants are convicted on the basis of weak or madeup evidence. Human rights violations are even more severe in antiterrorism courts that are supposed to try terrorists but mostly conduct trials of regular crimes.

Poor men comprise the vast majority of criminal defendants in Pakistan. Many cannot afford legal representation or put down surety for bail. Hence, over 70 per cent of our prison inmates are not convicts but under-trial detainees. Occupancy in most of our prisons is double or triple the actual capacity.

Lawyers often exploit litigants without consequences. A common complaint one hears from litigants is that their lawyer periodically asks for more money during the course of lengthy trials but does not provide any comprehensible information regarding case progress. Little wonder then that many continue to approach informal justice mechanisms such as jirgas, in spite of their many flaws, to resolve disputes.

Our professional bar associations do not act as regulatory and disciplinary bodies.

Bar associations here have an admirable record of fighting against constitutional subversion. It is important to inquire how effective they can be in these important endeavours if they consider themselves above the law.

Our courts do not enforce the many laws passed in recent years to protect women and children, the most vulnerable groups.

Provincial domestic violence laws allow women facing imminent violence from family members to obtain protection orders.

They also allow women to obtain residence orders restraining spouses or other familymembers from forcing them out of the family home. Courts often deny these protection and residence orders to the few women who approach them or delay the hearing for so long that they become pointless for women facing immediate threats.

More than 90pc of sexual violence cases end in acquittal. Courts almost always allow out-of-court settlements exonerating persons accused of `honour` killings. The Constitution gives high courts and the Supreme Court the power to enforce fundamental rights. These provisions allow citizens and civil society organisations to approach courts to challenge human rights violations. With some sporadic exceptions a judgement here and there the superior judiciary has not used this power to redress grave social injustices (enforced disappearances, for example). Instead, some Supreme Court judges used this power to encroach on other branches of government. Extreme examples of this include the disqualification of two sitting prime ministers in 2012 and 2017 by the SupremeCourt.

High courts monitor the appointment and performance of the district judiciary.

Even prior to the 26th and 27th Amendments, when the high courts exercised greater autonomy,they didn`t or couldn`t improve access anÄ quality of justice before the district courts.

We should not assume that the recent amendments will lead to a dramatic change in the quality of justice for better or for worse. The independence of the Supreme Court and the high courts is an important principle. But we shouldn`t focus disproportionately on constitutional design changes in the appointment of superior court judges and the superior judiciary`s structure.

Constitutional design doesn`t determine distribution of power between institutions.

This is especially so in the case of Pakistan where, to quote justice Athar Minallah, an `unelected elite` has large influence on judicial and political affairs in spite of constitutional design. We shouldn`t lose sight of the systemic political and social factors that prevent social justice and make our courts ineffective. It is these factors that determine freedom and independence of all, including the judiciary. • The writer is a lawyer and the author of Progressive Laws In Patriarchal Societies (Bloomsbury 2025).