THE Makkah alliance has moved, in less than two months, from a political declaration towards practical cooperation, though it remains a few steps short of becoming a fully operational military alliance.

Its Strategic Political and Defence Committee, which met in Riyadh on Oct 5, decided `to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defence commitments`.

The operative part of the decision, however, is narrower than some of the headlines it has generated.The three countries agreed to `take the necessary measures to provide the agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment in the Kingdom, in accordance with the approved arrangements and the national legislation of the Parties`.

The Saudi urgency to see the alliance working is understandable. Through September and into early October, Yemen`s Ansar Allah group, commonly known as the Houthis, fired missiles and drones towards southern Saudi cities and energy facilities, with Riyadh saying the attacks also targeted the holy cities. One such strike hit a power station in Madina supplying Masjid-i-Nabvi.At the same time, the Adenbased Presidential Leadership Council announced a counteroffensive to reverse Ansar Allah gains along the Red Sea coast. Government forces, backed by coalition air support, claimed to have recaptured Mocha and positions near Bab al-Mandeb, although those claims remain contested.

The Riyadh meeting and developments in Yemen came within a day of each other and are politically linked. On Sept 25, the three countries` military chiefs met in Riyadh and agreed to pursue intelligence sharing, military coordination and capability integration.

On the sidelines, Pakistan`s Chief of Defence Forces and Chiefof Army Staff Field Marshal Asim MunirandSaudiDefenceMinister Prince Khalid bin Salman also discussed continuing `joint efforts` against attacks on the Kingdom.

Between the lines The progress so far includes a political commitment, an institutional head and secretariat, two committee meetings, a meeting of military chiefs and a decision to begin implementation.

What remains missing is a standing assigned force, a joint commander, publicly defined rules of engagement and a published military doctrine. There is also no public authorisation for Pakistani or Turkish forces to participate incombat operations inside Yemen.

In fact, Turkish officials told Reuters on Wednesday that Ankara was `sending mainly defensive and technical support` to Saudi Arabia to help it fight the Houthis, adding that the support expected from Turkiye was only in the form of military equipment, intelligence sharing, and weapons systems, and that no other form of deployment had taken place as part of the alliance so far.

Understanding the alliance requires answers to basic questions that remain unresolved as to what constitutes a threat or an attack, against whom has the alliance been formed, what would trigger a response, and who would decide on action and through which command structure? In the absence of a published charter and doctrine, its working principles have to be pieced together from the August agreement, subsequent government statements and the Oct 5 decision.

The threat, in the language used by the parties, is an armed attack on a member`s security, sovereignty or territorial integrity, with particular emphasis on protecting Makkah and Madina. There is, however, no public definition covering attacks on forces, ships, diplomatic missions or personnel out-side nationalterritory.

Great expectations Yet the gap between the public positions of Pakistan and Turkiye, and Saudi expectations, is already visible. Prince Khalid said after the meeting that the committee had affirmed solidarity `in confronting the sinful aggressions that targeted the Kingdom and the Holy Sanctuaries, activating collective deterrence against these aggressions, and against all those standing behind them`.

The three partners may not wish to emphasise their differing interests, but these are clear: Riyadh wants protection for its territory and greater pressure on those attacking it, whereas Pakistanwants to honour its commitment to Saudi Arabia without being drawn into another Yemen war or a confrontation with Iran, and Türkiye seeks a larger regional security role but faces its own political and legal constraints.

The agreement can accommodate these differences as long as its mission remains defensive.

Its language is carefully circumscribed as it refers to capabilities already `agreed`, rather than whatever forces Riyadh might request, and specifies deployment inside the Kingdom under national legislation.

An Article 5 like commitment that still requires consultation, agreement and action under national law does not amount to an automatic military response.The reference to national legislation is particularly important. In Pakistan, a wider military role could revive debate over the unanimous parliamentary resolution of April 2015, which called for neutrality in the Yemen conflict while pledging that Pakistan would stand shoulder to shoulder with Saudi Arabia if its territorial integrity or the two Holy Mosques came under threat.

A deployment to defend Saudi territory and the holy sites, including the Pakistani presence already there, can be presented as consistent with that resolution. Participation in fighting around Mocha, however, would be much harder to reconcile with its language.

Any move beyond defensivedeployment could therefore require fresh political authorisation, raising questions about how far the government could depart from the earlier parliamentary position.

Previous pacts The trilateral framework is also building on, rather than replacing, the existing Pakistan-Saudi military relationship. Under the 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, Pakistani air and support elements were already deployed in the Kingdom.

This was possibly what InterServices Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry meant when he recently told a CNN interviewer that Pakistani troopshave been in the Kingdom `for decades`, and across multiple domains.

The understanding between Field Marshal Munir and Prince Khalid to continue cooperation against the attacks kept that bilateral channel active while aligning it more closely with the Makkah Alliance.

The additional capabilities envisaged under the Oct 5 decision are more likely to involve air defence, intelligence, reconnaissance and specialist support than a large Pakistani ground contingent for Yemen, which would sit uneasily with both the 2015 resolution and the government`s stated position.

A detailed version of this article can be accessed on Dawn.com