The state has always shied away from telling the truth about Balochistan and the people of Balochistan. When it comes to the troubles in Balochistan, official versions, including textbooks, talk about `traitors` and `hidden hands` and hold the sardars [tribal chieftains] responsible for most of the problems.

The truth has been kept away in order to misrepresent the genuine Baloch national question. A case in point is the recent book titled Mir Hazar Khan Marri: Muzahimat Se Mufahimat Tak [Mir Hazar Khan Marri: From Resistance to Reconciliation] by Ammar Masood and Khalid Fareed.

Mir Hazar Khan Marri was a veteran Baloch guerrilla commander, who earned the limelight in the early 1960s when Mir Sher Mohammad Marri, popularly known as Babu Shero, started the second Baloch insurgency against the state of Pakistan. Mir Hazar Khan, at the time, was one of his commanders in the Balochistan hills.

After the dismissal of the National Awami Party (NAP) government in 1973 by the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government at the centre, most of the Baloch nationalist leaders were put behind bars. It resulted in the third Baloch insurgency that was fought mostly by Marri Baloch tribesmen.

Mir Hazar Khan was at the forefront of the Baloch insurgency during those stand-offs with the state.

Later on, the tribal chieftain of the Marris, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Mir Hazar Khan fell out with each other due to personal differences.

Mir Hazar Khan Marri surrendered to the state in the 1990s and remained loyal to the state of Pakistan after that.

Unfortunately, the book is written from a narrow lens, to pave the way for the narrative of the state, using the shoulders of Mir Hazar Khan Marri, who died in 2021. Incredibly, although one of the authors, Fareed, claims to have been in touch with Mir Hazar Khan in his latter years, the book relies almost exclusively on interviews with his grandson rather than the man himself.

For instance, one of the factors that has been the cause of Baloch insurgencies in the country is contestation over Balochistan`s natural resources, which nationalists claim have been denied to the Baloch. It has been the bone of contention between the Baloch nationalists and the state from day one. In the book, however, the sardars and nawabs have been solely held responsible for the insurgencies.

While talking about Sui gas, the authors write that `the biggest treasure of gas was discovered in 1952 in Sui, Balochistan.` While they do point out that Dera Bugti where Sui is located did not receive gas itself until many decades later, they place the blame for this on the late Sardar Akbar Bugti, who they point out received royalty for the gas extracted from his area. They also point out that, after Akbar Bugti`s death, his heirs get the royalty, `which is worth crores of rupees annually.

However, they provide only a half-truth of the situation. For example, the authors claim `the gas supply started in Sui since 1987 at a limited level, and by 2011 it had covered the entire Sui.` This is far from the reality. There is no gas for the common Bugtis in Dera Bugti, and there is no dearth of literature about this fact. Even Quetta, the provincial capital, was last supplied gas back in 1985.

A book or a piece of research should convey fresh knowledge or new information that is unknown to the readers, instead of regurgitating old mantras, such as those about the root of all issues being the sardars and their vested interests.

There are other factual problems with the book. For instance, Nawab Khair Bakhsh, despite being a nationalist leader, was the tribal chief of the Marri tribe, one of the largest Baloch tribes in Balochistan. In tribalhierarchy, the tribal chief is supreme, and his decisions are final. Other than him, no one has the authority to take decisions in tribal matters and gatherings in the presence of the sardar.

Startlingly, the authors, who seem to be unaware of a basic understanding of how the tribal structure works, state in the seventh chapter of the book that Mir Hazar Khan presided over tribal jirgas in the presence of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. But in front of a sardar, all others are commoners, and they have to abide by the decision announced by the sardar.

In the 1970s, if Nawab Marri had said no to the war, there would have been no uprising in the Marri-dominated areas of the province. The authors too, in the eighth chapter, contradict themselves, stating that Nawab Khair Bakhsh was the tribe`s nawab, whose decisions were final, and no Marri could dare differ with him.

There is no dearth of such contradictions in the book. Among other things, while writing in the 13th chapter about the differences between Nawab Marri and Hazar Khan Marri, the authors claim that, during one election in Kohlu, circumstances worsened after the arrival of Nawab Marri. So Hazar Khan Marri sent a message to Nawab Marri to vacate the place within 48 hours, otherwise the consequences would be dangerous.

Keeping in view the worsening situation in Kohlu, the Nawab left Kohlu before the 48 hours were up, the book claims. This begs the question: can one threaten a tribal chief to vacate a tribal territory he owns? Obviously not.

In contrast, a renowned American anthropologist who lived among the Marris for more than a year found a `very striking` attitude of respect for the sardar in Marri society. Renowned American scholar Selig S.

H arrison, in his book In Afghanistan`s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, quotes the anthropologist saying that the respect for the sardar was of a level `. . .often approaching awe. It ascribed magical and superhuman qualities to his person and encompassed attitudes which elsewhere in the Middle East are reserved for saints and other holy men.

How does one square this with the claims of the book under review? Another point of contention is that, after the 1970s episode of the NAP government, Nawab Marri had quit parliamentary politics once and for all and had begun to lead the Baloch national movement. We have no other evidence he ever involved himself in parliamentary elections in Kohlu as claimed in the book.

Nevertheless, the book does contain some basic information about Mir Hazar Khan Marri, his family background, his ancestors` war against the Britishers, and his tribal tree etc.

There is also mention of The London Group, which may sound new to many readers unfamiliar with the history of the Baloch insurgency in the 1970s. Even though it was called The London Group, senior journalist Rashed Rehman, who was one of the members of the group and participated in the 1970s insurgency as a leftist revolutionary, once told this writer that all of its members, including he himself, his younger brother Asad Rehman, Ahmed Rashid, Najam Sethi and Dilip Das, who comprised the group, were not from London alone.

In fact, they were students from various universities in Britain, such as Oxford, Cambridge and working class institutions in Bradford and joined the Balochistan insurgency hoping to bring about a Marxist revolution.

Later on, after their `Marxist struggle`, most of them became well known journalists and authors.

The authors of this book have discussed The London Group in an incomplete context, and linked it to the issue of foreign funding for the Baloch insurgency. In other places, the book also attempts to paint the Baloch movement as a foreign-funded one, using the `evidence` of Mir Hazar Khan Marri being based in Afghanistan along with the other Marri fighters after the thini insurgency.

The book has attempted to decontextualise and misrepresent the Baloch question, especially the 1970s` struggle. In doing so, even Mir Hazar Khan Marri`s own life as a part of the movement has not been properly delineated. He deserves that his life be revisited and examined without bias and keeping in view all the necessary facts about him.

The truth needs to be told. But the truth, unfortunately, has become a rare commodity in this country.

The reviewer is a member of staff X: @Akbar_notezai