PESHAWAR: There have been at least seven peace deals between the government and various militant groups during the last nine years or so making militants bolder but most of them broke down.

Now, analysts insist the `anticipated` peace agreement between the government and the Tehreek-iTaliban Pakistan will possibly be action replay of the past.

When the first military operation called `Meezan` launched in 2002 in South Waziristan Agency failed to eliminate local and foreign militants, the army went for peace talks against the advice of the then political agent.

As a result, what the political agent had foreseen happened. Nek Mohammad, an obscure tribesman in his 20s, got the stature of a militant commander overnight and the army commander had to stoop to garland him after the signing of peace deal in April 2004. The militants have since been growing strong, while the government, despite the proven bleak history of peace talks, has once again optedfor it.

A critical assessment and background interviews on the previous peace deals between the governments and various militant groups reveal that the history of peace talks is bleak.

There is a fear that the same will be the outcome of the current peace process initiated by the government with now the more organised and emboldened Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.

`Since the current peace talks have started, militants have got more political recognition, more social space as well as more space in media,` says analyst Professor Khadim Hussain, who fears an action replay of the past peace negotiations, which instead of peace brought more bloodshed since militants got bolder after every deal broke down.

Peace agreements in the past also gave militants of tribal areas an opportunity to grow stronger during `peace time` as the government ceded territory to them for all practical purposes, according to experts.

There has been peace deals in Shakai with Nek Mohammad (April 2004), Baitullah Mehsud in Sarrarogha (Feb 2005) in South Waziristan, Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khalig in Miramshah (Sept 2006 and then 2007), Lashkar-iIslam in Khyber Agency (July 2008) and in Bajaur Agency (Feb 2009).

Under such deals, the govern-ment not only released militants, in one instance even paid money to militants so that they could return debt to Al-Qaeda. Such peace agreements were signed at a time when the political administration was almost restricted to their government compounds.

At first, the political administration and tribal elders were ignored during the signing of such deals with the then not so known militants.

As every deal broke down and made militants stronger, the political administration and tribal elders got weaker and lost authority.

Every time, the peace deal broke down, militants targeted the elders, who helped negotiate it.

The tribal system was gradually dismantled by militants.

Only two deals with Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulvi Nazir militant groups in North and South Waziristan are still intact as they have recognised the de facto lordships of the local militant commanders in their respective areas.

Such deals were simply agreements of mutual coexistence and understanding that militants would not attack Pakistani targets and do what they want in the neighbourhood.

The reason of militants of tribal areas getting so strong that they could even interfere in the May 2013 elections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata is due to thefact that for the last 10 years or so, they had been continuously growing strong and attacking targets in suburbs and old parts of Peshawar city easily.

While majority of these deals were struck with militants of tribal areas, only twopeace deals were signed by the Awami National Party-led Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government with militants of Swat and the Tehreek Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi chief Maulana Sufi Mohammad, which also broke down.

However, it was a more transparent deal as the 11-member committee comprising members of the government and the Swat Taliban tasked with executing the deal were known.

When the violations from the militants` side did not stop, the public owned the military operation against them. The Swat episode exposed how impossible it was to appease militants.

The deals, which were struck with militants in Fata, were somehow covert leaving doubts about restoration of the government`s writ even afterwards.

They collapsed as in such deals, often conditions were such that the government side of the deal was verifiable, while the militants` side of the bargain was unverifiable.

For example, the government freed many militants but the targeting of government installations or personnel never stopped from the militants` side, who could easily deny responsibility for such attacks.

Analysis of reports about the past peace agreements show that a forceful collective political and military resolve was lacking in such initiatives.

There was never a serious effort to eradicate militants but only to neutralise them or in other words efforts were only meant to stop them from overt activities.

Security analyst Brig (r) Mohammad Saad feels that the government`s besieged position and absolving the TTP from terrorist attacks would not help.

`They (TTP) are so arrogant that they have not even engaged directly in peace talks with the government.

Do you think they are crazy to let go of all that power and live like any citizen of Pakistan.