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Policies to prevent extremism

BY M U H A M M A D A M I R R A N A 2025-02-16
THE government has announced another policy related to countering extremism; it contains the same flowery words, borrowed jargon, hollow phrases, and unfeasible implementation plans as several policies before it. One can only hope that the National Prevention of Violent Extremism Policy (NPVE), announced by the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta), will not meet the fate of these previous policies, which are gatheringdustinbureaucraticcorridors.

The new policy, designed to meet the obligations of the revised National Action Plan (2021), is filled with ambitious goals centred on the five Rs: `revisit`, `reach out`, `reduce risk`, `reinforce`, and `reintegrate`. Like previous policies, the new policy also divides its implementation plan into three phases: short term, medium term, and long term from six months to five years.

It is intriguing how most security-related policy documents contain similar types of phrases, and bureaucrats think such terms make policy documents more attractive. However, in essence, the policy contains nothing that hasn`t been touched upon by previous policy documents, including the National Security Policy, the National Internal Security Policies, the Counter Violent Extremism Policy, and the National Narrative. There was no real need for any new policy document; instead, implementing previous policies was more important.

Although the NPVE encompasses numerous elements that state institutions must address urgently, security institutions have their own priorities and set the targets accordingly. They typically select components that align with ongoing practices from policy documents. For example, state institutions have done much to repatriate Afghan refugees and regulate media and social media spaces. They have evolved certain mechanisms for countering terrorism financing under the FATF obligations. Sadly, more critical issues have been included as mere fillers since the first internal security policy was conceived. These include the Balochistan reconciliation process, reforms in the criminal justice system, CT-related prosecution, and capacity building of security institutions. One critical point of effective collaboration between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement, for which Nacta was established, has been gradually eliminated from policydocumentation. The Joint Intelligence Directorate may have become active, but its effectiveness is not visible as incidents of terrorism are on the rise and the reach of militant groups is expanding.

Let us review the newly introduced policy available on the Nacta website. The entire document reflects a policing approach to social and ideological issues, which are traditionally outside the jurisdiction of the police. The components that catch the eye of the intelligentsia and international donors investing in counterterrorism and counter-extremism initiatives in Pakistan include the National Narrative by Nacta. The federal education ministry will introduce curriculum reforms, which will see messages of peace, tolerance, and diversity included in the syllabi.

The religious affairs ministry aims to create social harmony. To achieve these objectives, implementing partners will be the National Curriculum Council, the Higher Education Commission, the Directorate General of Religious Education, and the Ittehad Tanzimat-i-Madaris.

One wonders whether all these implementing partners have the will to implement these policies and introduce peace, tolerance, and diversity-based changes in the syllabi of learning institutions, especially in madressahs, which are se ctarian by nature and have their own interpretation of peace and harmony. Their political economy will suffer significantly if they agree to such reforms.

In addition, the policy discusses trust-building measures that will involve working closely with religious scholars. It will be interesting to observe how state institutions implement this component while working on a similar initiative under Paigham-i-Pakistan. There is no harm in launching a new initiative, but security institutions are currently implementing policies under Paigham-i-Pakistan, much like they did for the jihad policy for decades. Reaching out to religious institutions and introducing a `consensus religious accord against terrorism and extremism` cannot bring about change unless the religious community owns it and develops a consensus among themselves that society truly needs peace and harmony.

So far, the religious clergy listens to what the state institutions teach them under Paigham-iPakistan but often ignore this when deliveringreligious sermons, spreading, instead, the same religious, sectarian, majoritarian, and ideologically supremacist rhetoric.

Another interesting component of the NPVE is the establishment of dedicated centres for everything from research on countering violent extremism to media monitoring and spreading the National Narrative. This approach of creating new institutions while not reforming existing ones is flawed. Many institutions in the country are already working on religious reforms and constructing national narratives. These include the Islamic Research Institute, the Idara Sagafat-i-Islamia, and several universities with dedicated departments. Recently, a National Rahmatul-lil-Alameen Wa Khatamun Nabiyyin Authority was established despite the presence of these institutions. This has only added to the burden on thenationalexchequer.

There is a need to reform the existing institutions and provide them the freedom essential for academic discourse. One critical component involves campus surveillance to monitor any suspicious behaviour related to violent extremism, drug use, or crime. These incidents would need to be reported by the administration to the police. However, whether madressahs and private institutions will allow such surveillance is uncertain. Public sector institutions, already under intense scrutiny by agencies, would likely comply with the policy and could become the usual suspects and victims.

Under the policy guidelines, Nacta will also work to sensitise media houses and journalists on extremism and anti-state propaganda issues.

Mainstream media is already very conscious of these issues and regularly receives instructions from security institutions, and Nacta`s involvement may further restrict media freedom, as state institutions often define extremism and terrorism according to their political objectives.

One laughable component of the policy is that it advises parliament to constitute a national commission for reconciling warring communities.

Parliament is already a constitutional reconciliatory institution, and it raises questions about existing institutions when bureaucrats start advising parliament. • The wúter is a secuáty analyst.