HOW have political forces opposed to incumbent regimes managed to find their way (back) into political power? Pakistan`s history provides us with quite a few examples and a number of different ways in which this has happened. If one were to summarise broadly, three different paths emerge with varying degrees of success.

The first is the path of direct confrontation.

This involves mass mobilisation by opposition forces to prove their popularity. It, has at various points, also involved the use of public disruption and violence to force the state`s hand.

The clearest example of this path in Pakistani history is between 1968 and 1971. Mass mobilisation of Bengali nationalists culminated in an election win, which was denied. It led to further mobilisation, an insurgent fightback against the state, and eventually independence for Bangladesh.

The incumbent martial law regime of Gen Yahya Khan was defeated. A political force Bengali ethno-nationalism succeeded in its maximalist objective of creating an independent state.

Baloch nationalists have tried the same formula, but have so far not been successful. Demography, geography, and a number of other factors stack the odds against them. Yet a violent insurgency persists and non-violent social movements, such as the Baloch Yakjehti Committee, are still highly popular. If Baloch separatists are not succeeding in their objective of independence, the state is not succeeding with its own of finishing off Baloch nationalism as a political reality.

The second path through which opposition fortunes have turned is through institutional politics. This involves using elections, legislatures, judicial independence, and civil society to tip the balance and create political change. Like the first path, it too first involves proving popularity with the masses. This can be done by winning a large number of seats in an election and then using that advantage to shape parliamentary activity and constrainthe behaviour ofthe state.

This strategy can also use other sources of opposition such as other political parties, judges, and CSOs to put pressure on the state. At the very least it may help prevent the state from being more heavy-handed.The period in the late 1980s, with the MRD movement, is an example of this type of strategy.

The period between 2001 and 2007 in Pakistani politics is another prominent example.

Parties opposed to Musharraf`s martial law regime did enough in the 2002 election to not provide the dictator with a blank slate. They also took advantage of the fight with the judiciary to mobilise and place further pressure on the regime. Alliance with mainstream media provided another opening. All these factors ensured that a way back into power remained possible as and when other external conditions especially the interests of foreign powers allowed.

The third pathway is that of drawing room politics and backdoor deals. Here the logic is to wait for the incumbent regime`s own contradictions to spill out and use that to strike a bargain of somesort. It too involves first establishing some amount of public pressure.

This can be through election performance, jalsas, occasional show of force, etc. Collaboration with other opposition political parties is an integral part of this strategy, as is the use of the judiciary, media, civil society, and foreign brokers.

But ultimately what makes this path successful is the striking of deals; 2018-2022 provides us with the clearest example of this path. In October 2019, opposition forces led by the PPP and PML-N (with JUI-F`s human resources) mobilised to place pressure on the state. Based on that mobilisation they kept themselves in the game.

They then supported an extension for the army chief in exchange for easing of legal troubles (and in the case of N, safe passage for the leadership).

Ultimately they waited for the internal contradictions in the hybrid regime to spill out and used it to re-enter power, where they sit till today.The purpose of laying these strategies and examples out is to show what options the PTI has in front of it as it tries to get back into power. The revolutionary path that it initially chose was premised on social and institutional disruption mass mobilisation, quitting assemblies, and taking their grievance to the streets. Allegedly it was also designed to invoke internal pressure within the establishment that could force a change in policy.

That path has not produced the desired results.

The leadership is still in prison, the party is still in opposition, the bogus cases and coercion are still mounting, and the establishment has quelled internal dissent.

Progress through the second path has also stalled. PTI delivered a resounding election performance on Feb 8, 2024, but it was undone the next day. Initial relief through judicial activism was obtained, yet that too has now been shuttered by manipulation of the local judiciary and use of carrots and sticks with the superior court judges.

The passage of the 26th Amendment is designed to keep the judicial pressure off on the regime for the time being. However, increased unrest in the bar and bold stands taken by the Islamabad High Court judges might provide an opening similar to 2005-07 that the PTI may be able to capitalise on.

In its absence, the only other remaining option is drawing room politics and backdoor deals. An alliance with other opposition parties has been mulled and seems to be taking shape. Talks with the government suggested a softening of some demands.

The regime will have no interest in bargaining with the opposition except under foreign pressure or to obtain relative comfort of rule for the next year or so. If a judicial revolt does not materialise, the PTI can offer this comfort in exchange for some ease for its leaders and activists who are in hiding or in prison. Such a deal will not lessen the party`s credentials, which have been proven repeatedly. And it may deliver some respite to those who need it. • The writer teaches sociology at Lums.

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