AFTER discussing the damage caused to democracy by the two main political families (the Bhuttos and the Sharifs), I now broaden my focus to political forces.

I start with the parent Muslim League which ruled Pakistan in its key formative years. The analysis reveals the same ills plaguing it as all our main parties they have shown a stronger record in pursuing democracy when out of power but have undermined it later when in power.

Most recent breakaway states have had at least one of these traits before freedom that bolstered their case: past existence as a free state; natural nationhood with most people being of the same religion and ethnicity; physical contiguity; and/or prolonged abuse before freedom. The Pakistan demand was a unique case of pre-emptive nationalism, based on fears of future abuse. Despite missing these traits, Muslim League cleverly punched above its weight to still gain freedom. As sages say, in life you get what you negotiate.

But the salience of these traits did not end with freedom. These traits aid the case for freedom globally, as they also demonstrate (and influence) a state`s post-freedom viability. While the Muslim League got freedom without them, their absence posed huge challenges to post-freedom progress. Its own elitist nature, the lack of an egalitarian ideology and lack of roots in the new state and its economic backwardness enhanced its challenges. Thus, the Muslim League faced the daunting task of creating everything simultaneously and immediately state, nation, polity and economy from almost scratch, unlike most breakaway states.

Oddly, it had the perfect recipe to cement these shaky foundations via the devolved democracy idea given in the March 1940 resolution, perhaps under pressure from more grassroots regional politicians. But its own elitist, top-down DNA undercut its ability to operationalise it further before freedom or adopt it after freedom.

In fact, most of Pakistan`s political, economic, social and security problems stem from the shaky foundations laid by these pre-natal gaps and the founder party`s ill-advised policies to deal with them autocratically in early years. These foundations explain the constant instability of the building of our political system and the regular tremors it experiences as reflected in ethnic tensions, the centralisation of power, religion in politics, unconstitutionalism, the use of state violence to deal with public complaints and subservient ties with big powers.The Muslim League`s failure to produce a constitution early and hold national elections, dismissal of several provincial set-ups without good reason, inclusion of religion in the Objectives Resolution, and the dubious removal of prime ministers laid the seeds for these problems. So did the manipulation of the judiciary, the use of non-state groups in Kashmir, ethnically biased policies, the use of violence in Balochistan to quell dissent and the decision to join US-led alliances. The mould for the state`s autocratic approach that has lasted 75-plus years was laid at the very beginning.

In fact, it can be said that the very entity that birthed Pakistan also later impeded its natural progress. This also harmed it as the League became unpopular publicly, was unable to compete in free elections, and kept delaying them.

Its control slipped from elite politicians to conniving bureaucrats before it vanished into oblivion, dissolved in 1958 by a species higher on the food chain thaneven the bureaucrats. The security establishment took over the baton of our top overlords from the fading Muslim League and has held it tightly since then, passing it only within itself to its next chief periodically in grand ceremonies.My analysis ranks the League close to the bottom of post-freedom governance and longevity among a dozen freedom parties in Asia and Africa. Among Pakistani political forces covered so far, I would place Muslim League below the Bhuttos but above the Sharifs in harming democracy.

Pro-Bhutto readers may be miffed by their rank so far as the political force that has, arguably, undermined our democracy the most. However, the autocratic nature of its rule from 1972-77, their part in India-Pakistan wars, its role in the creation of the Afghan Taliban and in the current hybrid regime place them above other civilian political forces in undermining democracy.

But such readers may find solace in the fact that the Bhuttos are poised to lose this first place to the elephant in the room.• The wnter is a political economist with a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley murtazaniaz@yahoo.com X: @NiazMurtaza2