We have a tradition of writing history with distorted facts. The record must be put right.
Operation Gibraltar was launched with three assumptions: (a) Kashimiris living in the valley would extend full support to our soldiers entering Indian-held Kashmir; (b) The war would remain restricted to held Kashmir and Azad Kashmir; and (c) India would not cross the international border as assured by the US to our foreign minister.
All three proved wrong.
Gen Musa while addressing troops in Lahore said that it was on Sept 4 sometime in the evening, while sitting in the GHQ, that he asked some officer to tune in to All India Radio. A broadcast said that Pakistani Sabres had fired rockets in Amritsar. Since no such activity had taken place, it alerted Gen Musa who immediately called a special meeting which directed the DGMO to issue a flash signal to all the formations to be in battle location by the sixth morning as he smelled foulplay by thelndians.
Therefore,itisincorrectto suggestthat the higher command was sleeping.
Secondly, skeleton troops were already deployed in the trenches all along the BRB.
It was these troops who surprised the Indians. It was the army high command that ordered the airforce to attack Indian troopsAPROPOS the letter `The 65 war` (Sept 16).
We have a tradition of writing history with distorted facts. The record must be put right.
Operation Gibraltar was launched with three assumptions: (a) Kashimiris living in the valley would extend full support to our soldiers entering Indian-held Kashmir; (b) The war would remain restricted to held Kashmir and Azad Kashmir; and (c) India would not cross the international border as assured by the US to our foreign minister.
All three proved wrong.
Gen Musa while addressing troops in Lahore said that it was on Sept 4 sometime in the evening, while sitting in the GHQ, that he asked some officer to tune in to All India Radio. A broadcast said that Pakistani Sabres had fired rockets in Amritsar. Since no such activity had taken place, it alerted Gen Musa who immediately called a special meeting which directed the DGMO to issue a flash signal to all the formations to be in battle location by the sixth morning as he smelled foulplay by thelndians.
Therefore,itisincorrectto suggestthat the higher command was sleeping.
Secondly, skeleton troops were already deployed in the trenches all along the BRB.
It was these troops who surprised the Indians. It was the army high command that ordered the airforce to attack Indian troopsadvancing towards Batapur. The rest is history.
President Ayub had resisted the idea as he foresaw India crossing the international frontier in retaliation at a point of its choosing, but the Bhutto faction backed by some generals ultimately got the approval to go ahead with Operation Gibraltar followed by Grand Slam.
The `65 war was a collective failure of civil and military leaderships. However, our army defeated the Indians on all fronts except for some setback in the Sialkot sector. It is true the war remained inconclusive as we made mistakes but India suffered greater humiliation because they made blunders.
