ONE simple fact makes it all very clear. These people did not cut the deals they had cut to come to power in order to change things. Those who have wearied of hearing all the talk about the problems and ask for `solutions` need to understand this. Nobody is interested in `solutions` in this country. Not even the problems.

This has been true for a while, but never has it been as true as it is today. There was a time when the pursuit of power in this country had some sort of a purpose. Those were the old days when the civil-military axis was alive and kicking.

From 2008 onwards, you could see a gradual consolidation of power in civilian hands. First through the successful conclusion of three general elections which effectively enshrined the principle that none other than the people of this country will choose their leaders. But equally importantly, beneath the surface, there was another crucial shift happening. The material resources of the state were coming increasingly under civilian control after a decade of dictatorship.

The material resources of the state refers to the concrete things the state controls, such as its fiscal resources, foreign exchange, urban land, and underground resources like natural gas.

These are the spoils of power. It is the control of these that animates Pakistan`s politics. And broadly speaking, in the decade from 2008 to 2018, you could see democratically elected civilian governments steadily asserting their control over these. The NFC award of 2009 helped by throwing a substantial chunk of these resources to the provincial governments, where they were firmly in the hands of purely civilian authorities and beyond the reach of uniformed powers to appropriate for themselves. So the power struggle in Islamabad was left to revolve around control over the shrinking pie left behind in the federal government`s coffers.

A tussle played out over control of the fiscal as well as foreign exchange resources of the state.

One graph published by this newspaper during those years illustrated this. It showed the incremental disbursements under defence expenditure in each fiscal year, the amount spent overand above what was budgeted at the start of the fiscal year. When expressed as a percentage of the original allocation, the incremental amounts spent were shown coming down in a neat are from 2008 till 2017, when they shot back up suddenly. There was even a year when the disbursement was slightly less than the amount budgeted at the start of the fiscal year.

This was evidence of a certain fiscal discipline being brought in slowly but surely, and beneath the surface of politics where the headlines played out. The graph was not measuring the quantum of resources being split between civilianand defence-related heads. It measured the sway of discretionary power in making spending decisions. For comparison, if you plot the development budget on the same graph, you willnotice its shape goes in the opposite direction, meaning resources were being diverted from one head to another in a long, slow shift. What killed all of this was the `hybrid experiment`, or `same page` as its proponents in the PTI called it back then. In that one move, the democratic transition that began in 2008 effectively ended.

The control of the material resources of the state increasingly passed out of civilian hands and the game of politics changed from trying to enshrine the principle that the people of the country should choose their own leaders, to having our leadership vetted and selected by the permanent establishment.

If 2018 struck the first blow to the democratic consolidation that was underway in the preceding decade, the terminal blow was struck in 2024. And here we are today, staring down another decade of rule that our own defence minister describes as `hybrid`.And the priorities that shape our economic policy have changed accordingly. Nobody denies that Pakistan needs to strengthen its defences.

After the recent war with India, and especially after the recent disastrous war between Israel and Iran, the need for a robust defence is more evident than ever before. And with this government that need will be met without complaints.

But let`s also add this: the need for reform, for change, is also more evident than perhaps it ever was. The sheer intensification of the revenue burden, the inflationary consequences of not being able to earn foreign exchange in quantities sufficient enough to pay for the economy`s import requirements, all weigh heavily on us today. Who is going to help change this? The present government has surrendered on that front before they even began. This was the time to bring some sort of change to the power sector, considering energy cost weighs more heavily on our manufacturing and exports in particular than customs duty tariffs. Yet we see nothing resembling reforms there. A privatisation push is gathering momentum, which is hopeful, but it will take a lot more to make a meaningful difference anywhere.

The most urgent area where reform is required is on the tax side. Intensifying the burden on compliant taxpayers is a losing proposition and undoes any other efforts the government might undertake in other areas. Here, too, we see nothing but tinkering on the margins.

These are the wages of hybridity. This is where the derailment of an ongoing democratic transition has brought us. It is an irony for bloodshot eyes that those crying about their mandate being snatched from them are the very ones who brought about this derailment. Their karma is our misfortune. Today, we don`t have a government looking to solve any problems. We have a compromise candidate as prime minister, who seeks only to tread water, not upset any powerful interests anywhere, keep the IMF programme afloat, and nurture his hard-found stability. This is not solving problems. This is managing them. • The writer is a business and economy joumalist.