MAMMOTH public gatherings are a distinct feature of political life in the subcontinent. In a bid to muster public support through such rallies, towering personalities like Liaquat Ali Khan, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto have lost their lives.

The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan and Benazir Bhutto at the same venue in Rawalpindi itself speaks of compromised security and the value we attach to the real meaning of protection. Yet both our leadership and police management have not learnt any lessons.

Often the communication gap between police and leaders provides space for militants to strike. And parties in opposition do not trust security alerts compiled by government agencies, hence trust deficit compromises security.

Perhaps nowhere else in the world is the security of public meetings and leaders shared with the volunteers of political parties. Undoubtedly, security is a professional and highly sensitive task and cannot be performed by volunteers. Volunteers may also act as facilitators of militants, hence the practice needs to be discontinued. In recent public meetings, political supporters have been seen standing on the edges of the moving vehicles of their leaders. Such practices seriously compromise safety.

Whenever opposition parties maintain an aggressive posture the administration usually goes on the defensive and thereafter security is compromised. Foolproof security also requires communication between the organisers and the police.

Since security is a costly af fair, the deployment of manpower and mobilisation of resources should be in accordance with the threat assessment and the number of people expected to attend the meeting.

Owing to prevailing circumstances, `human-eye dependent` security cannot secure the venue, hence technology-led solutions are required. The police are primarily equipped with walk-through gates and handheld metal detectors. The police force requires mobile CCT V and monitoring units, explosives detectors, mobile jammers and sniffer dogs.

Effective security cannot be accomplished without advance missions, but in Pakistan advance assessment is either missing or a haphazard, ceremonial affair. For such events `security orders` are issued without contingency plans. Often security orders are ambiguous and drafted without threat assessment. In case of any mishap it becomes difficult to fix responsibility. Hence those who are entrusted with ascertaining the facts often opt to shift responsibility to weaker actors.

The venue often becomes contentious between organisers and the administration.

Parties usually prefer venues that can accommodate big crowds. Instead of safety, crowdpulling is their top priority. To avoid a stampedeor to facilitate evacuation it is imperative to provide safe exits. Closed venues lil(e stadiums have their limitations. Hence perhaps the provincial capitals should have exclusive demarcated venues for public meetings and protests.

Undoubtedly, better management could have prevented tragedies like Karsaz, Liaquat Bagh or the deadly stampede in October at a PTI rally in Multan. Technology can be effective in preventing such incidents.

Effective monitoring can not only prevent losses but also helps investigators.

In 2006, during Haj 346 persons were killed in a stampede. Since 2007 live crowd analytics software is being used and since then no such occurrence has been reported at the pilgrimage. Live data feeds arrive in a monitoring room where police analyse the data. The software provides accurate and real-time data.

From such data, patterns of crowd behaviour can be analysed and accidents prevented.

In many recent local public meetings, thestage has been overcrowded. This is a serious security breach. As per international standards, the stage should not have more than seven persons at a time. An overcrowded stage provides an easy opportunity for terrorists to strike.stage has been overcrowded. This is a serious security breach. As per international standards, the stage should not have more than seven persons at a time. An overcrowded stage provides an easy opportunity for terrorists to strike.Populist passions often excite leaders, compromising security. Often the leadership removes protective bullet-proof glass or mixes with the crowd. They should not forget that militants follow their targets like shadows.

The proficiency of terrorists can be understood from the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

The assassin knew the enthusiastic crowd would compel her to emerge from the sunroof and wave. For the late leader, the use of the public address system fitted inside her vehicle would have been the most appropriate option.

According to the UN report, more attention was paid towards deployment, hence the personal protection of the leader was weak.

Recently a few leaders have visited shrines with big crowds. Such practices need to be rethought.

Often in public meetings the physical distance between the first row and the stage is compromised. The required distance needs to be strictly observed.

It is imperative that contingency plans should be drafted and exercisedin consultation with the emergency services and other organisations. The situation also warrants voluntary drafting and implementation of a `code of ethics` to be followed by the political parties and their workers.• The writer is a police officer