FOR long, Punjab has been a fertile ground for religious extremist groups. The latter have been successful in cultivating a resilient political economy in the province. This ecosystem has deepened its roots, and has frequently operated openly, caring little for potential legal consequences. The recent passage of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Act in the province marks a significant, albeit delayed, policy development. But it remains to be seen whether the law`s enactment will actually translate into a meaningful shift in Punjab`s posture, especially with regards to how its law enforcers engage with extremist actors who have continued to asserttheirpresencepublicly.Inmanyinstances, LEAs have not merely refrained from acting against such groups but have actually been seen to extend tacit or open support to them.

The problem of religious extremism is, of course, not limited to Punjab. It exists across Pakistan, from the tribal districts of KP to urban centres in Sindh, though its expression varies.

However, Punjab and urban Sindh continue to function as primary breeding grounds. Despite this reality, state institutions have largely hesitated to take on these networks head-on. Instead, they have opted to issue policy documents replete with lofty aspirations but lacking measurable outcomes.

With Punjab`s move, all four provinces now have CVE legislation, with KP being the first to pass a CVE law and establish a dedicated centre under its higher education department in 2021.

Balochistan followed with its version of the law in October 2024, placing the CVE framework under the anti-terrorism regime. Sindh passed a similar law in April, and Punjab completed the cycle on June 17, 2025, placing its CVE efforts under the purview of the home department.

However, except in the case of KP, none of the provincial CVE centres are as yet operational.

Most of them are in various stages of the bureaucratic process. Meanwhile, at the federal level, the National Prevention of Violent Extremism Policy, 2024, was approved by the cabinet in December. This policy had indicated the establishment of dedicated centres at the provincial level for various purposes, including research on countering violent extremism, media monitor-ing, and disseminating the national narrative.

Whether these provincial initiatives will align with the federal framework or evolve into provincial silos is not clear. The language of the provincial laws suggests a degree of autonomy that may challenge the formation of a cohesive, national-level CVE architecture.

Ultimately, the real test lies not in the legislation itself but in the political will and institutional coherence required to translate policy into practice. Without that, the CVE framework risks becoming yet another document filed away in government archives, a merely symbolic gesture against a dangerous threat.

A closer look at the drafts of the recently passed CVE Acts in the provinces reveals uniformity in the language, structure, and mandates almost copy-pasted it would seem. Each province claims that its CVE centre will adopt a comprehensive, multi-sectoral approach to CVE, but the mandates are near identical, stressing research, policy development, strategic coordination and regular reviews. The centres are tasked with developing action plans which support government bodies and international entities such as the FATF, and establishing mechanisms for intelligence gathering and dissemination.

These institutions are also designed to foster collaboration with religious leaders, civil society and experts, while building capacities through training modules, fellowships and public outreach initiatives. Youth, women, minorities and rural communities receive special focus, along with modern-day challenges such as online radicalisation, hate speech, and disinformation.

International cooperation and media engagement are also central to this framework all in the name of advancing social cohesion and constitutional values.

The CVE centres themselves are not unique either. Pakistan already hosts a range of institutions engaged in religious reform and the construction of national narratives, operating at both the federal and provincial levels. Among them are the Islamic Research Institute, the Idara Sagafat-i-Islamia, and various university departments with overlapping mandates. Yet, instead of reforming and strengthening the existing bodies, the state continues to createnew institutions which often have overlapping goals. The establishment of the National Rahmatul-lil-Alameen Wa Khatamun Nabiyyin Authority, despite the presence of multiple similar platforms, illustrates this trend of institutional duplication.

Previously, too, it has been pointed out on these pages that meaningful reform must begin with existing institutions, and that includes granting them the autonomy they need for genuine academic and intellectual discourse. A component of the current CVE framework includes campus surveillance, ostensibly to detect and report suspicious behaviour linked to violent extremism, drug use and criminal activity. While public sector universities, already subjected to agency oversight, may comply with such measures, it remains uncertain whether madressahs and private institutions will allow similar scrutiny.

Surveillance policies could disproportionately target public institutions, turning them into scapegoats rather than sites of transformation.

The problem of extremism in Pakistan cannot be addressed solely through legislation, CVE centres or narrative-building initiatives unless the state demonstrates the genuine political will to confront the networks and ideologies that sustain extremist groups. As Senator Pervaiz Rasheed rightly observed in a recent Senate speech, the foundation of peace and cohesion lies in the guarantee of equal citizenship. That equality cannot be established through policy papers alone; it requires actively dismantling the hate infrastructure that targets religious minorities and fuels sectarian divisions.

The most critical task is bringing violent extremists under the rule of law. The repeated failure to do so has not only eroded the state`s authority but has also turned legal institutions into objects of public cynicism. For any counter-extremism initiative to work, police forces, LEAs and, most crucially, the lower judiciary must undergo serious reform and ideological deradicalisation. These institutions need to be capable of performing their duties free from guilt, bias or sympathy towards extremist narratives. • The writer is a secunty analyst.