n the mid-19th century, the concept of the `Muslim Ummah` found immediate traction among the Muslims of South Asia. According to the historian Mubarak Ali, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid I actively promoted a policy of pan-Islamism, in an attempt to strengthen the Ottoman Empire and bolster the empire`s standing against European powers.

Ali wrote that one of the reasons this idea became popular among most South Asian Muslims was that, after the decline of over 500 years of Muslim rule in India, Muslims suddenly became conscious of their minority status in the region. Some Muslim scholars tried to come to terms with the rise of European colonialism by shaping a reformist variant of Islam as a way to adapt to Western modernity.

This then evolved into becoming a demand for a Muslim-majority nationstate in the region.

The concept of the nation-state had been evolving in Europe from the 18th century. By the early 20th century, it had become one of the most powerful ideas in the world. It was a geographical idea about territory with well-defined borders within which populations that shared cultural, political and economic ideals and interests resided.

In the late 1930s, Muslims of India warmed up to this idea. Led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, they looked to create a modern Muslim-majority nation-state (Pakistan), where they would be able navigate their own destiny without any interference from the `Brahmin Hindu hegemony`, which Jinnah`s party feared India would become after the departure of British colonialists.As opposed to a nation-state, what the 19th century Ottoman Sultan was offering was a `civilisationstate.` A civilisation-state is a political entity that identifies itself with a continuous cultural or historical civilisation.

So, the Sultan was proposing a broader Muslim state built on shared civilisational traits.

During the post-colonial era, when empires had all but crumbled and the West had raced ahead in the fields of politics, economics and science, the idea of the civilisation-state looked cumbersome and regressive. The idea of the nation-stateseemed moresuitableto the post-colonial order. But these states had to accept certain universalities to be accepted in the community of nationstates. These universalities included human rights, democracy, freedom of religion, international laws etc.

The concept of the nation-state was largely based on `civic nationalism` and pluralism, even though nationstates founded on a particular faith or ethnicity were tolerated as long as they accepted the universalities.

The concept of civilisation-state is not new as such, but the term is. It was coined in the 1990s with the emergence of `globalisation`.

Increased interconnectedness and interdependence between nations began to weaken traditional boundaries and the authority of the nation-state. According to the American scholar Francis Fukuyama, globalisation led to a decline in national identity, diminishing the power of the nation-state. The rise of populism in the last 15 years or so is often seen as a reaction against globalisation and against the consequential decline of nationalism and/or national identities.

The bid to secure these resulted in radical (right wing) nationalism, but it rejects the pluralism and theuniversalities that were inherent in the idea of the nation-state. This radical nationalism then began to mutate, becoming a `civilisational nationalism` that looks to create civilisation-states.

In most cases, it is the already existing nation-states that are seeking to change their ideological disposition in this regard.

Russia is an example. After the demise of Soviet communism and of the Soviet Union itself, the civilisationstate is a recurring theme in the rhetoric and political discourse of Russia`s long-time ruler Vladimir Putin. He insists that Russia is not just a nation-state but a unique civilisation with its own historical, cultural and spiritual identity, separate from `Western civilisation.

India is another example. The government of Narendra Modi, which came to power in 2014, has increasingly described India as a civilisation-state because, apparently, it predates colonial rule and Muslim invasions. Emphasis is put on the centuries-long practice of Hinduism, which dates back to the Bronze Age. Modi`s perception of India as acivilisation-state is therefore at odds with the secular and diverse nature of Indian society, enshrined in the Indian constitution. This has led to the `othering` of minority groups, especially Muslims.

Turkiye under Recep Tayyip Erdošan (since 2001) has been positioning itself as a civilisation-state, undercutting the Turkish nationalism/ republicanism first established by the founder of modern Turkiye, Kamal Ataturk. Erdogan defines Turkey`s identity and foreign policy as rooted in its long history and cultural heritage, encompassing various empires and civilisations that have existed on Anatolian soil especially the Ottomans.

Iran too sees itself as a civilisationstate or as the continuation of an ancient civilisation, despite it being an Islamist theocracy since 1979.

China also explains itself more than just a nation-state. It sees itself as a civilisation with a continuous cultural identity that spans millennia.

Interestingly, far-right parties and populists in the United States, and in many European countries too, havestarted to call their nation-states as civilisation-states, despite the fact that Europe is the birthplace of the idea of the nation-state. However, like in India, the emphasis in this regard in these regions also is more on `nativism`.

In this case, white nativism. This marginalises non-white groups.

Pakistan has experimented with two competing narratives to add elements of the civilisation-state to its nationalism. The first sees the country as a continuation of ancient civilisations that emerged on the banks of the River Indus. The other sees the country as an outcome of the initial spread of Islam from the confines of Arabia.

According to the British political philosopher Christopher Coker, more and more governments and movements have been using the currency of civilisation for their policy ends. He wrote, `At the level of consciousness, political regimes are tapping into more primal identities.` Coker spoke of `Mythopoeia` the process of making myths. According to him, `Mythopoeia took place in the West and in the East. Two opposing forces, cosmopolitanism and nativism, now confront each other, revealing how the imagination can shape identities in bizarre ways and how intellectuals in cahoots with a political class can hoodwink both themselves and others.` The civilisation-state can be understood as a tool for a state that wants to legitimise the power of a particular kind of political system. Its overarching theme is the rejection of the aforementioned universalities and the insulation of societies from the influence of other civilisations. Civilisation-state may have a broader meaning, but its intent is largely myopic.