ANOTHER false start and another abrupt end.

Just when we were told that the military was raring to go into North Waziristan an operation that ideally should have begun at the onset of winter and was already late by at least two months and simply needed two weeks to start rolling, the government suddenly announced that it was sticking to the talk-talk and no action plan.

Talks with a myriad of Pakistani militants, we are told, will be given another chance. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said the nation was tired of picking up and burying bodies.This talk about talks is not new. It began back in April 2004 in the beautiful Shakai valley in South Waziristan, when the state surrendered and ceded its authority amid media glare. On that inglorious day nearly ten years ago, a general was garlanded and a militant commander handed over a rusty sword as a mark of honour.

The rest is history history that we all know well.

Indeed, talks have been tried and tested again and again from Khyber to Mohmand and Bajaur, from Orakzai to Kurram and from North Waziristan to South Waziristan. All they have yielded are death and destruction they have claimed thousands of lives and damaged the social, economic and psychologicalfibre of the people.

And so, just when we were told that the military and political leadership were, for the first time, on the same page, it turns out that they were not even reading the same book! It seems as if the military is ready to roll but the prime minister is not willing to signal an end to the `hold`.

So we are back to square one, which in PML-N world is titled `talk`. If nothing else, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif must be given credit in his seven months in office, the committee he announced on Wednesday is his third endeavour to negotiate with the erring Taliban.

Earlier, a five-member committee formed to negotiate with Tehreek-iTaliban was stopped in its track, or so wewere told, because of the drone strike that killed its chief, Hakeemullah Mahsud.

Later we were told that a senator from the Mahsud part of South Waziristan was secretly tasked to negotiate with Khan Said alias Sajna, and apparently some progress was made. But then last week his house was bombed in Tank, bringing that effort to its logical end.

And now Nawaz Sharif is trying again.

The four-member committee two very accomplished journalists, a retired military and intelligence officer and a bureaucrat-turned-diplomat-turned occasional columnist is interesting to say the least.

Three of them have well-known stated positions on talks with the Pakistani mil-itants; in fact, the views of one are diametrically opposed to what has been the stated position of the Pakistani establishment.

A cursory look at the events leading up to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif`s long-overdue appearance at the parliament, the appointment of a well-known writer and columnist as his adviser on national affairs and the composition of the committee, is enough to illustrate how much time and serious thought was given to the move.

Militarily, the initiative, which ideally should lay with the army, seems to have gone for a six. Even otherwise, the targets in Mirali and other places in the restive North Waziristan, are now believed to have moved to safer locations.

The militants` visibility in Mirali and Miramshah has already been reduced. The strikes, which were carried out in retaliation to Bannu and R.A. Bazaar attacks by militants, have already dried the swamp, so to speak.

Politically, the now-we-doit (military operation) and no-we-don`t (talks) approach has not helped the government`s image. It comes across as confused and incapable of taking decisive action.

Yet, it has still won over some political parties full endorsement from two principal advocates of peace talks with the militants Imran Khan and his politicalnemesis, Maulana Fazlur Rehman.

But what happens next will be much more important than the initiative itself.

The talks cannot be openended. There has to be a timeframe.

Second, their terms of reference will have to be clearly spelled out to ensure clarity and avoid ambiguity.

On their part, the militants have time and again spelled out their demands in no uncertain words enforcement of shariah in the country; end to drone strikes; withdrawal of military from the tribal regions; release of prisoners; end to military operations; and the parting of ways with the United States.

It seems as if the TTP has not heeded the government demands at all which include terms such asaccepting the rule of law and the writ of the state; ending terrorism, stopping crossborder movement; and giving up their support for foreign militants.

Given the experience of the last one decade, both sides lack confidence in each other and would need iron-clad guarantees, should the committee succeed in bringing them to some sort of an agreement.

But the problem is that the TTP is willing to take responsibility for the groups under its umbrella, but it is not willing to give any undertaking on behalf of the many foreign militant groups or the groups not associated with it even though these groups have been working and living with them.

And this will be the real challenge.