PESHAWAR: Peshawar High Court has ruled that an individual’s right to freedom of speech must be protected, but it must be balanced against the rights to dignity and reputation ofthose affectedby such speech.
A single-member bench of JusticeBabar Sattar observed that the right to freedom of speech was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution, which was, however, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law.
‘The Defamation Ordinance is one such law that imposes restrictions on freedom of speech in cases involving defamatory statements, thebench observed.
Thebenchhasreleased a20-page detailed judgement while rejecting an appeal filed by a resident of Swabi, who challenged an order of the Swabi district court whereby a damages suit filed against him was decreedinfavourofrespondents.
The district court had deliveredthe judgement on Nov 25, 2024, whereby the suit filed by the respondents under Section 3 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002, was decreed and the appellant was directed to pay compensatory damages of Rs0.5 million to them jointly.
The appellant, Afzal Khan, had filed complaints with the Swabi district police officer (DPO) and deputy commissioner wherein he alleged that the respondents including Adil Nawaz and five others were land grabbers and had encroached upon a graveyard in the area containing his ancestralgraves.
The respondents had filed the damages suit stating that the complaints were false.The bench observed that Article 14 of the Constitution guaranteed the dignity of citizens, whereas Article 4(2) (a) provided that no action detrimental to life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person should be taken except in accordance with law.
‘It was for the appellant to establish the defence of truth or privilege, which he failed to do as correctly held by the district court.
Even in relation to damages, the approach of the district court was fairly conservative and lenient. It does not warrant interference by this court in its appellate jurisdiction,’ the bench ruled.
The bench also addressed thequestion whether a complaint submitted to the police or deputy commissioner amounted to ‘publication’ under the Defamation Ordinance.
The bench has quoted Section 2 (e) of the Ordinance, which defines publication to mean ‘the communication of the words to at least one person other than the person defamed and includes a newspaper or broadcast through the internet or other media.
‘An application to the police and/ or the district administration constitutes communication of words to at least one person and, therefore, amounts to publication as correctly held by the learned district court, the bench ruled.The bench observed that Section 3 of the Ordinance provided that defamation constituted ‘publication or circulation of a false statement or representation made orally or in written or visual form which injures the reputation of a person, tends to lower him in the estimation of others or tends to reduce him to ridicule, unjust criticism, dislike, contempt or hatred.
‘Written statements of a defamatory nature qualify as libel in terms of Section 3(2) (ii) of the Defamation Ordinance,’ it maintained.
Advocate Mohammad Arif appeared for the respondents and contended that communication of defamatory words to a person other than the person defamed constituted publication for the purposes of Section 2 (e) of the Ordinance, and that the requirement had been satisfied in the instant case.
He argued that the constituent elements of defamation under the Ordinance had been established, as the allegations made by the appellant had been found false by the police authorities and the district administration, both of which had conducted inquiries.
He argued that the appellant had also failed to establish the truth of allegations before the district court.
He stated that his clients were respectable individuals, who had been involved in professional, social and political activities and belonged to a family of Maliks.
‘Calling the members of a family the Qabza Mafia (land grabbers) and accusing them of usurping and encroaching upon land comprising a graveyard is not a statement of opinion. It is an imputation of organised criminality, extortion and moral turpitude,’ the bench observed.
‘Where written words directly impute to a person the commission of a criminal offence, dishonest conduct or moral delinquency, the words are defamatory per se, as correctly held by the district court,’ it maintained.
‘The natural consequence of such an allegation is that an ordinary, reasonable reader or official would regard the person accused with suspicion and aversion and holds that person in lower estimation,’ the bench ruled.