IN a new movie starring Salman Khan, Bollywood has smartly invested in a tale that can reap financial benefits by inflaming the emotions of Indians still traumatised by 1962. But behind the Galwan incident of 2020 lies a tale that is far more fascinating than the movie itself: the riveting story of the Sino-Indian border.
But let us rewind first to the 19th century, when Russia and Britain were fearful that their nemesis was advancing towards an area stretching from presentday Afghanistan to Tibet. Kashmir had come under British control in 1846, but it was not clear where the boundary lay between Ladakh and Tibet. A map drawn by W.H. Johnson suggested that Al(sai Chin lay within Kashmir, but later, in 1899, the British proposed a different boundary to China, which showed that a big chunl( of Al(sai Chin belonged to the latter. In short, there was neither delimitation (verbal or written agreement) nor demarcation (marking the line on the ground) of the border between China and British India in the Western Sector.
Enter the Eastern Sector. Here, again, no boundary existed between China and British India, but the latter did adhere to the so-called Inner and Outer Lines.
However, in 1913-14, the momentous Simla Conference was held, attended by representatives of British India, China and Tibet. Britain proposed dividing Tibet into Inner and Outer zones. A weal( China asked its envoy to leave and thus, in a moment of great wisdom, saved itself from calamity. However, Tibet, which was claimed by China on the basis of both international treaties and custom, and Britain did sign an agreement, a secret part of which specified the McMahon Line (MML) as the border between India and Chinese Tibet. The border was thus delimited but not demarcated, and was not agreed upon by China. The line was drawn by a marl(er whose width on the map would cover many mountain crests.
Move forward to 1959. By now, India had gained independence, China had moved from weakness to strength and reestablished control over Tibet, the Dalai Lama had fled Tibet to seek refuge in India, Nehru was firmly in command of India, and had extended India’s control up to the MML, but there was still no boundary in the Western Sector. And China had been suggesting to India that they stabilise the border, to no avail.
Nehru was a great leader with two minor blemishes: he ruined India’s economy and he ruined India’s relations with China. He now made three pivotal blunders which would have a long-term impact.
First, he completely misread what Chinawanted. China wanted to settle the border with India around the MML, with one proviso: negotiations on the MML should be held afresh. Why? Remember, the MML was agreed upon by the British and the Tibetans. If China agreed to the MML, it would have to admit that Tibet in 1913-14 was independent.
Second, Al(sai Chin, some 15,000sq miles of barren land, was of no use to India but was vital to China because of the presence of a road which connects Tibet with Xinjiang. China would have ceded the North-East Frontier Agency’s (NEFA) 40,000sq miles to India but would never have accepted Indian control over Al(sai Chin.
Third, in one of the most self-harming moves, Nehru initiated his infamous ‘Forward Policy.’ Remember, the borders in both sectors were not demarcated. And we are tall(ing about some of the highest, roughest landscapes here. Nehru ordered Indian troops to move forward and start occupying the spaces in between the Chinese outposts, and even fire upon the Chinese tovacate their posts.
The Indian generals warned Nehru against this madness, but to no avail. A senior Chinese diplomat told me, ‘they started cutting up our soldiers to pieces and we did not move a muscle.On Oct 20, 1962, the Chinese, fed up, attacked across both sectors. The Indian 7 Brigade dissolved into thin air. The war was over as soon as it began. The Chinese occupied NEFA, and, in one of the most astonishing moments in world history, declared that they would unilaterally withdraw.
The war left Nehru’s reputation in tatters. It ‘gifted’ Kashmir to Pakistan on a silver platter, and led India into making a U-turn and accepting the West’s military aid. The war also sowed the seeds of an enmity which was many times more pronounced in an India where the population was never told the truth than in China, where much saner minds had been in command.
In 2026, when Salman Khan’s movie on the Galwan incident of 2020 is released to an emotional population, the latter will not be told that it was Nehru’s hubris, intransigence and folly which had led to this state ofaffairs.
History can be more fascinating than Bollywood movies.
The writer has a First-class degree in history from Oxford and has worked in China as a diplomat.
aamir3123@gmail.com