Page 31 · Business & Finance

P3A Merger: A bold reform or another bureaucratic shuffle?

The government has moved to bring privatisation and public-private partnership (PPP) transactions under a single institutional framework through a proposed merger of the Public Private Partnership Authority (P3A) with the Privatisation Commission.

The Privatisation Commission (Amendment) Bill, 2026, currently before a National Assembly Standing Committee, seeks to establish a new body called the Privatisation and Public Private Partnership Commission by merging the two existing institutions.

The move is aimed at streamlining approval procedures, reducing duplication and providing investors with a single institutional platform for privatisation and PPP transactions. Until now, investors dealing with the two types of transactions have had to navigate separate boards, approval processes and advisory arrangements.

Under the proposed legislation, both functions would come under one board and approval framework. The bill also formalises the prime minister’s April 2026 decision to place P3A under the Privatisation Division and provides a comprehensive federal legal framework for PPP projects.

The proposed merger comes amid a widening gap between available public resources and the country’s development needs. The federal development budget for the current year stands at Rs1.13 trillion, against an estimated requirement of Rs4.1tr. The government hopes to mobilise private investment to help finance infrastructure and public service projects that cannot be funded through the budget alone.

Besides, fixed timelines, project preparation facilities and viability gap funding are intended to address the delays that have historically held back the implementation of such projects.

The legislation also seeks to strengthen transparency by making PPP agreements public documents. Private partners would be required to meet contractual performance standards, including obligations related to service delivery and maintenance.

For taxpayers, the proposed framework provides for greater scrutiny of the government’s financial exposure to PPP projects. A risk management unit in the Finance Division would review fiscal commitments and guarantees before projects receive approval.

This assumes importance as contingent liabilities arising from PPP arrangements have already exceeded Rs472 billion, according to the information accompanying the proposed legislation.

The bill also seeks to establish clearer risksharing arrangements between the government and private partners. The state would not be responsible for risks that are not assigned to it under the relevant contracts. Public financial support would generally be limited to viability gaps and other agreed commitments, while private partners would finance, build and operate projects under contractual arrangements.To improve financial continuity, the proposed law provides for four ring-fenced, non-lapsable funds: the Privatisation Fund, Public Contribution Fund, Viability Gap Fund and PPP Project Development Fund. These are intended to ensure that project preparation and implementation do not suffer from the annual lapsing of budgetary allocations.

The new commission would have a board comprising 11 to 15 members, including eight to 12 independent members. Its composition would include at least one PPP expert and two women, with members serving three-year terms.

The bill also provides for dispute resolution through mediation and arbitration, alongside the Privatisation Appellate Tribunal.

The proposed merger also intends to address concerns that the consolidation of the two institutions could mean the sale of more public assets. However, the new commission would handle both outright privatisation and PPP arrangements, which involve private investment and expertise without necessarily transferring ownership of the underlying public assets.

The legislation provides savings clauses to protect ongoing projects, contracts and funds from disruption during the institutional transition.

The merger makes institutional sense insofar as it removes overlapping mandates and gives investors a single point of contact for privatisation and PPP transactions. But bringing two institutions under one roof will not, by itself, accelerate private investment or improve project delivery. Pakistan’s experience with PPPs has been constrained less by the absence of an institutional framework than by weak project preparation, political interference, regulatory uncertainty and the government’s limited capacity to assess and manage complex contracts. A single commission may reduce procedural duplication, but its success will ultimately depend on the quality of its project pipeline and the transparency of its decisions.

There is also a need to guard against the temptation to treat the PPPs as an easy substitute for public development spending. Private financing is not free money. Governments often end up bearing substantial fiscal risks through guarantees, viability gap funding and other contractual commitments. The disclosure of agreements and independent scrutiny of contingent liabilities will therefore be critical. With PPP-related liabilities already exceeding Rs472bn, the proposed risk management unit must do more than provide procedural clearance. It should ensure that projects offer genuine value for money, allocate risks realistically and do not saddle future governments and taxpayers with hidden costs. Above all, private investment should complement public spending, not become an excuse for the state to retreat from its responsibility to provide essential infrastructure and services.